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Number 4--0ctober 1968

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
LIBRARY
DEC 16 1968

. .
I Issues .1n 1968
Const1tut1ona
ELLIS WALDRON, Director
Bureau of Government Research
University of Montana
Montana voters will find three proposed amendments to their state constitution on the November 5
ballot. If ratified, these amendments will:
1. Increase to six (from the present three) the
number of amendments which might appear on
the ballot in future elections.
2. Extend to 80 days (from the present 60) the limit
on the regular biennial session of the Legislative
Assembly.
3. Allow incumbent public officers to benefit from
legislative increases in salary for public officials.
The bare language of these amendments leaves
much to the imagination of the voter. This Report
seeks to identify some of the considerations raised by
the proposals and to relate them to other developments of some interest in the Montana political system.
I hope that a majority of voters will approve each
of the three proposed constitutional amendments.
Certainly as a group, they promise more for the
achievement of useful, modern state and local government than any submitted to the voters of Montana in recent decades.

The Six-Amendment Amendment
The "Six-Amendment" amendment should be ratified for either of two reasons:
1. The Constitution of 1889 is demonstrably too difficult to amend, and its three-amendment restriction
is the principal reason for this difficulty.

2. This amendment would facilitate a conservative,
step-by-step modernization of the Montana Constitution that would be more in tune with the state's
needs and political practicalities than a general overhaul of the charter by a constitutional convention.
Difficulty of the Present Amending Process
Two-thirds of the 1967 Legislative Assembly agreed
that the Montana Constitution is too difficult to
amend, and that the three-amendment limitation is a
major part of this difficulty.
The Montana requirements that two-thirds of each
house support proposal of amendments, and that a
majority of those voting on ratification must approve
it, are common among state constitutions. But Article
XIX, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution also requires that "not more than three amendments to
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this constitution be submitted at the same election."
The proposed amendment on the ballot November 5
would increase this maximum number to six possible
proposals.
Only five state constitutions dating from the 19th
century have been amended fewer times than the
Montana charter.
A comparison of many hundreds of amendment
proposals introduced in the Montana Legislative Assembly with the 51 which reached the ballot before
1968 suggests several things about what happens
when the legislature considers these proposals:
1. Amendment proposals introduced in each house
are weeded out in the chamber of origin with little
regard for what may be happening in the other
chamber; each chamber then tends to reject the
proposals which come from the other, and some kind
of formal or informal summit conference resolves
the conflicts late in the session.
2. On the average, less than two proposals finally
reach the ballot. Only four times-1920, 1924, 1950
and 1968-have three amendment proposals reached
the November popular ballot.
3. An important qualitative selection also seems to
happen to amendment proposals on their way to the
voter forum. Proposals which would do something
important get waylaid at some stage of the intricate
legislative process. Proposals survive that have two
of the following three attributes: a) superficial attractiveness, whatever the merits; b) lack of obvious
threat to any significant interest, or trivial importance for most voters; c) support of some effective
economic or political interest which will mobilize
votes for proposal and ratification without arousing
opposition.
There seems to be nothing exceptional about reaction of Montana voters to proposed amendments;
they have approved 72 percent of those which
reached the ballot. This compares with a national
average of 74 percent ratifications among 1600
amendments proposed in all states during a recent
decade.
Prospects for Constitutional Reform
Pressures of national and local governments for
new address to urban and community problems,
along with the abrupt, phenomenal success of the reapportionment revolution in the mid-1960s, have
quite generally quickened interest and activity to

revitalize state government. In Montana as elsewhere, citizen groups have expressed the need to
modernize legislative and judicial systems. The three
amendments on the 1968 ballot have unusual potential for such modernization. And the 1967 Legislative
Assembly also directed its Legislative Council to explore whether the state constitution needs a general
overhaul. A Council subcommittee found scarcely
half of the 1889 Constitution to be "adequate" for
modern conditions, and the Council will propose to
the 1969 Assembly that a constitutional commission
make detailed studies and recommendations to revise
the aging state charter.
The advantage of a general constitutional revision
is the likelihood that changes proposed in a single
package will provide a compatible working system
of government. But the disadvantage of general constitutional revision, as recently attempted in such
states as New York, Maryland and Rhode Island, is
that the big single package draws the fire of all the
groups . which .might be adversely affected by any
small provision; the sum of the particular segments
of opposition then outweighs popular support for
ratification. So the legislatures in these states are
trying to sort out the most valuable fragments for
re-submission as particular amendments.
Any constitutional document "vests" interests
either by specific provision or by common understanding and interpretation. Examples in Montana
are, of course, the ancient and classic limitation on
taxation of mining property, and the modern dedication of vehicle license and use revenues to highways.
But much modernization of state and local government could be accomplished to allow effective
responses of political agencies to a host of problems,
without touching provisions such as those respecting
taxation of mining property or allocation of highway
use revenues. Especially if some body such as a constitutional commission could select and present carefully-planned series or groups of individual amendments, some modernizations could be achieved even
if others failed to gain popular support. Much could
be accomplished without raising frontal opposition
of interests whose sense of self-protection leads them
to resist any change anywher~ in the political system.
Even under present arrangements the Montana
Legislative Assembly could submit rather sweeping
revisions of segments of the government, or of
governmental functions, as single amendments or as
a limited series of related amendments.
More effective and well-conceived revisions could
be accomplished by this essentially conservative approach under the six-amendment provision than
under the present three-amendment limitation.
Coupled with prospects that the 1969 Legislative Assembly may create a commission to develop this approach, the six-amendment proposal holds unusual
interest as a conservative, step-by-step avenue to constitutional modernization.

The 80-Day Session Amendment
The amendment to increase the length of biennial
legislative sessions from 60 days to 80 days should be
ratified for at least three reasons:

1. Legislators need more time for effective internal

handling of the modern legislative workload.
The present constitutional time limit induces
unreasonable haste and unnecessary confusion.
2. To be representative, the legislative process
must afford time and opportunity for effective
communication between citizen-constituent and
legislator. The 60-day session frustrates this
kind of communication and makes everyone
unduly dependent on the intermediate role of
the professional lobbyist who can live with the
legislature through the session.
3. It may no longer be possible to "stop the clock"
to extend the final day of the session. There is
real possibility of deadlock between legislature
and governor over calling a special session to
complete legislative work, and extension of the
session by 20 days would somewhat reduce the
dangers of such deadlock.
The second of these reasons seems most fundamental but it can be understood best after examining
the effects of the 60-day time limit on internal legislative processes.
Effects of the 60-Day Limit on Legislative Processes
For a particular legislative measure, the 60-day
session is a myth. Most bills are introduced between
the 15th and 20th day; they go to a committee which
is supposed to complete its consideration of the bill
within seven days. If the bill survives in the first
chamber it is supposed to reach the second house by
the 42nd day. Since most bills die in the chamber
where they were first introduced, the heart of the
legislative action is best represented by what happens there in the month between the 17th and the
42nd day. There pressures build beyond description
as a reasonable representative process.
Granted, most bills should not survive process in
the first chamber. But the suggestion here is that
under existing pressures of time and facilities, professional lobbyists representing too narrow a range
of interests wield inordinate influence over decisions
about which bills should survive and which should
die. It must be recognized that professional lobbyists
are absolutely essential to the legislative process;
those who are present in Helena are there by right;
and generally they represent their interests in a
forthright and legitimate manner.
The heart of the problem is that the structure and
fabric of the legislative process working during midsession should be opened up, should be given more
time so that other interests than those now so well
represented can get into the act too. Politics defensive of established interests is really fairly easy
under the present system, while the promotion of
imaginative new responses to large, pervasive and
complex problems requires more time and communication between constituent and legislator than present circumstances afford. It is inordinately easy to
defend old institutions and interests and inordinately
difficult to gain a hearing for new ideas and interests.
An examination of the Assembly's committee processes in mid-session will indicate why this is so.
The rule requiring a committee to report a bill
within seven days is a direct and ridiculous product

of time pressure. But for the time limit on the session, a sensible rule would require at least seven days
notice before committee consideration of a bill. Some
state legislatures have some such rule.
In Montana committee consideration of a bill is
frequently scheduled on less than 24 hours notice;
and information about the bill number, its contents,
the time and place of a committee meeting on it, and
whether that meeting will be public or closed, is so
scattered and haphazard that know ledge of these
essential details becomes the stock-in-trade of lobbyists. Occasionally "public hearings" will be scheduled well in advance with ample notice to interested
parties; experienced observers recognize these hearings as ritual performances which have little relevance to the usual committee processes.
In practice the seven-day rule is waived or extended when legislators or lobbyists interested in
the bill establish the need for more time to let interests be heard. But what about affected interests
which do not even know that the bill exists, or that
it is in committee about to be heard, or what it
contains because the text of the bill has not been
available-without the mediation of a professional
lobbyist?
As pressures build toward midsession, legislators
abandon their weekend trips home, to work seven
days a week. This also is a direct product of the time
limit on the session. It robs both legislator and constituent back home of the opportunity to communicate about what is going on and to exchange views
about what should be done. Conscientious legislators
commonly complain that they do not hear from their
constituents when it might do some good, but that
they get loud protests weeks or months later about
their mistakes. How else could it be when: (1) the
legislator, however conscientious and wise, could not
possibly know, or have time to communicate about,
concerns of any but the most visible and importunate
constituents; and (2) the constituent has no reasonable opportunity to learn what is pending unless he
is represented virtually full-time by a hired lobbyist
to "bird-dog" the bills which might affect him?
Nor can the burden of such communication be
dropped on the doorstep of the n ews media. The
daily press in Montana, as elsewhere, almost exhausts
its possibility of service by printing titles of bills introduced, and by reporting what happened-after it
happened-to a rather select number of "important"
or spectacular measures. Systematic reporting of
committee processes is beyond the reach of even
great metropolitan newspapers. Radio and television
media are even more limited and retrospective in
their span of attention. The production schedule and
space limitations of weekly county newspapers makes
the "bird-dogging" of legislative proposals quite out
of question for them-at least within the Montana
legislative timetable.
Pressures are so great during midsession that a
legislator not infrequently misses notices of hearings
on bills he has sponsored, or finds that he should be
before two committees in different places at the same
time.
Meanwhile, amidst these pressures, the professional lobbyist with a limited number of bills which

concern him, and mastery of the simple but scattered
keys to the confusion, cultivates the members of the
committees which will consider "his" bills, keeps
track of time and place of meetings and hearings, and
carefully mobilizes his forces for maximum impact
at critical junctures in the process.
In deliberations of the Montana Citizens Committee on the State Legislature the only open opposition
to longer or more frequent sessions was expressed by
several professional lobbyists who customarily live
with the Assembly in Helena during its frenzied
biennial short sessions.
In recent years the Montana legislature has simplified its rules and procedures, streamlined its committee structure, shortened the time for introduction
of bills, amplified interim research on important
problems, and remodeled its facilities in efforts to
achieve more efficient operation within existing
space and time limits. Proposal of the 80-day amendment is a clear message from the legislators that they
have done most of what they can do to modernize
their operations within existing constitutional limits
on time and architectural limits on space and facilities. They are asking for more time because in their
judgment the public interest requires it.
More Time for the Citizen and His Problems
The 1967 Assembly handled about the same volume
of business-1,000 proposals and 400 enactments-as
the first three sessions of this century-the 1901, 1903
(with two special sessions) and 1905 Assemblies.
Whatever the justification for a constitutional 60day limit in 1889, its gross effect today is to heighten
the legislative advantage of organized special interests whose politics are a daily preoccupation. Meanwhile broadly significant legislation in areas such as
health, environmental control, education and community development suffer precisely because their
base of popular support, although broad, lacks organized representation at the right time and in the right
places. The action is over in the short legislative session before spokesmen for these broad interests can
identify each other and get organized. This must always be the case in some measure, but a 60-day
measure is destructive of public interest and effective
representation under modern circumstances.
How might 20 more days open up the legislative
process at critical points? Without trying to rewrite
the rules for the legislature, suppose that the 20-day
deadline is retained for introduction of bills, but that
the 60th day becomes the deadline for transmittal of
bills to the second chamber. Nearly two weeks would
be gained during the mid-session struggle with the
great bulk of bills, while an additional week would
be provided for second-house consideration of bills
and for end-of-session business.
The seven-day rule for committee discharge of bills
might be relaxed. A new rule might require that
mimeographed or offset copies of a bill, and public
notice of a committee hearing, must be available five
to seven days prior to committee consideration of the
bill. This would improve opportunity for communication in trade papers, organization newsletters and
other modes of advertisement. Constituents could
meet and plan t elephone or mail communications to

interested persons and groups. Citizens could arrange work schedules or personal affairs for a visit
to Helena. News and radio editors would have time
to write editorials and publish them. Lobbyists could
be recruited, briefed and sent to Helena in time to
be useful. Legislators might even get another weekend or so at home to talk with constituents during
the critical mid-session.
Citizen groups have recognized the need for more
legislative time. In 1966 about 70 prominent community and legislative leaders in the Montana-Idaho
Assembly on State Legislatures proposed that all
constitutional limits on length and frequency of sessions should be removed. Their report said: "Legislators find it difficult to learn what constituents desire on major issues since relatively few constituents
contact their legislator and these contacts often relate to legislative issues of narrow concern. It is difficult for constituents who are not part of a special interest group to evaluate the work of their legislators
because of lack of informRtion."
Another group, the Montana Citizens Committee
on the State Legislature recommends an annual session without time limit, combined with an annual
salary, while supporting the 80-day amendment as a
"step in the right direction." Its poll of legislators
after the 1967 session evoked many statements of
urgent need for more time to schedule committee
meetings and to conduct public hearings. Recognizing that 20 more days would not solve all problems, many legislators believed that more time
would allow more representative legislation.
Montana's legislative problems are more common
than unique. In recent years ten state legislatures
have moved from biennial sessions to annual sessions
while several others have extended or removed tim~
limits on their sessions. My own opportunity personally to observe not only the Montana Legislative
Assembly but those of Ohio, Wisconsin and Massachusetts which operate without time limits, persuades me that more is to be gained in the Treasure
State now by extending the length of biennial session than by annual meetings, particularly if the annual session would be limited to 60 days. Short
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annual sessions would not solve the problems of
representative process discussed in this Report.

The Salary-Limit Amendment
Ratification of this amendment would allow the
Legislative Assembly, in its discretion, to raise the
salary of a public officer during his elected or appointive term of service. This would extend to other
officers the benefits of a 1964 amendment which permitted increase of judicial salaries during the elected
term of service.
The central issue is whether public service can be
kept even moderately attractive to energetic and
professionally competent people. The present constitutional limitation operating in an inflationary
economy requires a public officer to accept a salary
cut for each year of continued service. Meanwhile
most persons in private employment anticipate fairly
frequent upward adjustments of their wage or salary
to meet rising prices.
It can be argued, of course, that the person accepting public office recognizes this handicap. But such
a handicap scarcely increases the appeal of public
service for young professionally trained people.
The problem is particularly acute where long and
overlapping terms are involved, as among county
commissioners who are elected at two-year intervals
for six-year terms. If the legislature now raises the
salary for commissioners, only the commissioners
next elected can receive the increase. A commissioner elected in 1968 would have to wait until a new
term starting in 1974 to benefit from a salary increase
authorized by the legislature in 1969.
MONTANA PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT
Bureau of Government Research
University of Montana
Ellis Waldron, Director
Emilie Loring, Research Associate
The Report presents the results of research and responsibly developed recom,m,endat10ns on matters of public concern. The statements and opinions expressed are the responsibility of the contributmg authors and do. not reflect positions of the Bureau or the
Umvers!tY unless. so mdic;ated. Publi~he.d bimonthly during the
academic year. Smgle copies or subscriptions available on request.

IOS6S e1noss!w •eue1uow JO Al!SJ.JA!un
4:lJeasa~

1uawuJaA09 JO neaJns

l~Od3~ S~IV:l:IV ~nsnd

VNVlNOW

